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Executive Interview
An Interview with Dan Champeau and Chad Lewis
Conducted by Daniel Rascher
Dan Champeau is a Managing Director in Fitch’s Global
Project Finance and Public Finance groups and leads
Fitch’s sports finance practice company-wide and is also
head of the Municipal Public Finance Group’s New York
Office. Fitch currently has about 1,600 employees in 50
offices.
In November 2003, at 33 years old, Dan was named as a
recipient of the SportsBusiness Journal’s “40 Under Forty”
award; which recognizes the 40 Top and most innovative
sports industry executives under the age of 40. Dan has
also won the “Smith’s Research and Rating Review Annual
Analytical Award” in Revenue Bonds twice in the past few
years for his work as an analyst in the sports finance field. 
Since joining Fitch Investors Service, L.P. in 1994, Dan
has been involved in transactions involving all four of the
US major league sports, including league-wide deals,
sports franchise transactions, and public and private
placement sports facility transactions in the US, Europe,
Asia, Australia, and other locations throughout the world. 
Fitch has opined on roughly $17 billion in sports
finance debt over the last decade. Fitch has rated more
than 65 sports related debt transactions and reviewed
about 120. Fitch-rated clients have included Major
League Baseball; the NFL; the NBA; Boston Celtics;
Phoenix Suns; Washington Redskins; The Staples Center
in Los Angeles, CA; The Pepsi Center in Denver, CO; The
American Airlines Arena in Miami, FL; and the refinanc-
ing of the America West Arena in Phoenix, AZ; as well as
major league facilities in Boston, Tampa Bay, Detroit,
and San Francisco.
Dan also manages all Tax-Exempt Revenue Bond Sectors
nation-wide including Health Care, Housing, Public Power
Utilities, Higher Education, and Transportation. Through
his various management responsibilities, Dan oversees
about 60 employees. Dan is also a member of the Public
Finance Executive Committee and Credit Criteria Policy
Board.
He has been an authority on sports finance having spo-
ken as an industry expert at approximately 35 industry
events over the past few years. In addition, he has
appeared on CNNFn, ABC News, Forbes.com’s
SportsMoney, and other media outlets as an expert to
discuss sports finance, has been quoted regarding sports
finance in the SportsBusiness Journal, the Wall Street
Journal, Barron’s, Investment Dealers Digest, Investors
Business Daily, The Bond Buyer, and numerous other
publications. Dan lectures annually at Columbia
University, NYU, and Florida Atlantic University on the
bond markets and the sports business in particular.
Prior to joining Fitch Investors Service, L.P., Dan was
at AMBAC Inc., working in the corporate finance depart-
ment on strategic financial planning, budgeting, compet-
itive analysis, and cash flow modeling.
Dan received his BA from the University of Maryland
at College Park, attended Fordham University Graduate
School of Business, and received an MBA from San
Francisco State University.
Chad Lewis is an Analyst in Fitch’s Global Project
Finance focusing on both sports-related transactions and
other revenue-backed infrastructure transactions. Since
joining Fitch Ratings in 2002, he has been involved in
transactions involving all four of the US major league
sports, including league-wide deals, sports franchises,
colleges and universities, and public/private placement
sports facilities in the US and Europe.
Chad primarily focuses on stadium and arena transac-
tions as well as the league-wide credit facilities for the
NFL, NBA, and MLB. He has played a lead role in trans-
actions including Citizens Bank Ballpark in Philadelphia;
Dolphin Stadium in Miami; the Verizon Center (former-
ly MCI Center) in Washington, DC; PETCO Ballpark in
San Diego, and the Los Angeles Dodgers. Additionally,
Chad is responsible for monitoring ratings in Fitch’s
sports portfolio on an annual basis. 
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Chad has been a guest speaker at Columbia University,
NYU, and Florida Atlantic University on the bond mar-
kets and the sports business in particular. Prior to joining
Fitch, Chad worked at the Dormitory Authority of the
State of New York, which issues tax-exempt bonds for
colleges, universities, hospitals, and other non-profit
organizations. Chad received his BA in political science
and economics from the University of Rhode Island and
was a member of the men’s ice hockey team. 
Role and Trends
Q: What are the essential skills needed for your job? 
A: Essential skills for the job include a solid core under-
standing of sports franchises and the league economics
and the relationships between the two. Additionally, a
strong financial background including the ability to ana-
lyze financial statements, financial modeling and forecast-
ing, legal aspects of bond transactions, and understanding
of demographic elements in an area that could impact a
transaction, both positively and negatively, are necessary. 
Q: What are the recent trends or changes in rating debt in
sports?
A: Overall, sports in the US are in a very unique position.
All four of the major leagues currently have Collective
Bargaining Agreements (CBA) that extend until at least
2011 (certain provisions in the NFL that allow for an
early termination) and all are arguably in a good position
from a television broadcast standpoint, excluding the
NHL. However, Fitch believes the new CBA should allow
for a sizeable national television contract given the ele-
ments in the new CBA, underlying leagues economics,
and strong fan base. Fitch has also seen strong growth in
attendance numbers across all of the leagues, strong
renewal rates of suites, key sponsorships, and advertising
contracts, and no immediate signs of negative trends.
Essentially, the recent trends are that the underlying eco-
nomics of the leagues have strengthened.
Q: Are there fundamental differences in debt rating in
Europe, Asia, or Australia? If so, what are they?
A: Fitch approaches ratings in similar sectors the same
throughout the world. Standard financial measures,
including debt service coverage ratios, acceptable leverage
amounts, debt maturity length, legal packages and
covenants, and construction packages are all viewed the
same. The key differences are in the structure of the
leagues. Clearly the Premiership League has a structure
which differs greatly from any league in the US, in that,
the top 10 clubs greatly benefit from the television con-
tract revenues and the bottom 10 clubs receive a signifi-
cantly smaller portion. Given this structure, revenue cer-
tainty based on the television contracts is significantly
less; however, there are certain structural features that
mitigate some of the concerns.
Q: Why was/is Wall Street biased against sports debt? 
A: Historically, there has been a negative bias towards
sports as a business from the debt side. People not involved
in the industry have viewed sports as not being a real busi-
ness, and not having meaningful, bankable, real revenue
streams that could support ongoing amounts of debt, but
rather as an entertainment venue where they go to have a
beer and hot dog. This has changed as investors on the buy-
side and investment banks have gained comfort with the
economic models of the leagues, and as league and team
officials have put forth the effort to help the market under-
stand their business from a financial wherewithal perspec-
tive. Over time, there have been fairly sizable long-term rev-
enue contracts that have been relied upon for long-term
debt issuances in the billions of dollars. Any analyst will
have a healthy sense of skepticism when reviewing a new
industry for them, but once they see the excellent track
record of debt in the industry, the Wall Street bias has gone
away. This industry has performed exceptionally well.
There are very few problems that one can point a finger at.
In fact, there has been no debt that Fitch has rated in sports
that has even come close to defaulting.
Example
Q: Please take us inside of a project, such as your work
involving Dolphins Stadium. What were the key elements?
A: In 2006, Fitch rated a transaction for the South Florida
Stadium Corp. (Dolphins Stadium, formerly Pro Player
Stadium and prior to that Joe Robbie Stadium). Fitch has
had a long rating-relationship with the stadium dating
back to the early 1990s. The Stadium Corp. issued
approximately $100 million in revenue bonds supported
by certain stadium revenues. This transaction is unique
because the stadium, which was constructed in 1985,
continues to be a marquee stadium, which in addition to
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attracting such events as Super Bowls and BCS National
Championship games, plays host to the NFL’s Miami
Dolphins and MLB’s Florida Marlins. The key elements
of the transaction looked at the Dolphins’ renewal rates
of key contracts, including advertising and sponsorships,
suites and club seats, all pledged to the bonds and atten-
dance levels for both the Dolphins and Marlins, respec-
tive lease agreements and risks associated with those, and
other events at the stadium. Fitch ultimately downgraded
the bonds to ‘BBB’ from ‘BBB+’, which is still very strong
for a sports stadium rating, but given higher leverage and
lower forecasted debt service coverage levels, Fitch appro-
priately lowered the rating by one notch.
Details
Q: What are the methodologies and criteria applicable to
the sports sector and which of these are fairly unique to
sports?
A: Some factors that help determine league credit ratings
and ratings for related team and sports facility debt trans-
actions include the following: 
• Player salary restraints 
• National television contracts
• Revenue sharing among member clubs
• Role of league in team financial matters
• Other financial policies, including debt limits
• Relationship with players’ union
Fitch views sports ratings from a top-down perspective
for team-related ratings as well as project finance stadium
and arena financings. From this perspective, team and
sports facility ratings are analyzed within the operating
and regulatory environment of their parent league, which
provides analysis of that league’s core function, econom-
ic model, financial policies and legal structure.
Consequently, it is in some ways analogous to the “sover-
eign ceiling” concept of the international bond markets
when rating the debt instruments of nations and their
sub-sovereigns or applicable corporate entities, such as
provinces, states, or corporates that are part of and oper-
ate within that respective nation’s laws and financial reg-
ulations. For sports facilities, the rating ceiling could be
somewhat different, though this scenario is unlikely, as
stadiums and arenas may have strong economic charac-
teristics stemming from multiple anchor tenants and the
ability to host many other revenue-producing events.
The economic model of professional sports began to
change when the crush of sports-facility building began
in the early 1990s that introduced teams to additional
revenue that was never before realized. This added rev-
enue provided teams with financial strength to be utilized
in signing marquee players that could be lured away dur-
ing free agency with higher salaries and also helped to
increase the value of sports franchises. National media
contracts between the leagues and television networks
also skyrocketed, along with player salaries and player
endorsement contracts, creating a big business out of
sports with an ever-increasing focus on financial success.
An understanding of league policy and procedures, as
well as its underlying economic model, is a prerequisite
for considering franchise fundamentals. It is the compet-
itive nature and long-term stability of these associations
that foster and preserve fan interest, which, in turn,
attracts advertisers and broadcasters. Macro- and micro-
influences, such as demographics, stadium and arena
issues, and management ultimately differentiate the
financial profiles at the team level. These influences help
serve as key credit support measurements. 
Because most debt at the team level is secured by a
direct lien on the franchise, team debt can be considered
a hybrid transaction incorporating elements of both a
traditional cash flow obligation, as well as elements of an
asset-based transaction. As a result, Fitch’s approach
gives appropriate consideration to both of these measures
in establishing a senior secured rating. A more favorable
rating will be considered where the team is the legal oblig-
or (team-level debt), as opposed to a holding company or
partnership (HoldCo. or partnership) debt. The position
of the borrower addresses such issues as structural subor-
dination and being closer to the economic assets of the
transaction. Debt at the HoldCo. level is structurally sub-
ordinate to debt at the team level, similar to the concept
of a holding company in traditional corporate finance. 
Timeliness of Repayment and Collateral
Coverage Ratings
Establishing a senior secured rating is a two-step process.
The first step involves establishing a timeliness of repay-
ment rating or implied senior unsecured rating. The sec-
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ond step involves notching from the implied senior unse-
cured rating based on the collateral coverage provided by
the value of the franchise. 
Implied Senior Unsecured Rating in Senior Secured
Ratings
The implied senior unsecured rating effectively serves as
the starting point for the secured rating. Key considera-
tions for establishing an implied senior unsecured rating
consider the overall quality of the team’s key revenue
components. More specifically, Fitch differentiates con-
tractual revenue streams from non-contractual revenue
streams. Contractually obligated revenues (COR) prima-
rily include national and local media contracts, local
sponsorship agreements, and luxury suite rentals.
Sometimes revenues are referred to as “highly probable.”
These revenues are not explicitly contractual but have a
contractual component that may be represented as high-
ly probable. Highly probable revenues are analyzed and
reviewed to determine the likelihood that they will be
realized. Fitch considers highly probable revenue streams
as revenues that are not necessarily contractual but,
through historical evidence, suggest a high probability of
realization. Season ticket sales, which have demonstrated
consistent renewals over a long period of time, may be
considered highly probable. The greater portion of rev-
enues deemed contractual and/or highly probable, the
higher “quality” assigned to these revenue streams. 
Another key analytical factor is a team’s COR as a per-
centage of player payroll. Because player payroll consti-
tutes the largest cost component for a team, the extent to
which player cost can be matched against contractual rev-
enue streams helps to assess a team’s reliance on less cer-
tain revenue streams to support player payroll, operating
expenses, and debt service. COR representing greater
than 70% of total player expenditures will, on average,
result in a higher implied senior unsecured rating.
Conversely, teams with COR substantially less than 70%
of player cost will likely receive lower implied senior
unsecured ratings. Teams operating in leagues with weak
restraints on player costs and loose debt limitations, as
well as those in which the COR is less than 70%, would
most likely have the lowest implied senior unsecured rat-
ing. To date, Fitch’s implied senior unsecured ratings
have ranged from ‘B–’ to ‘BBB–’.
Traditional cash flow-based credit metrics, such as total
debt/EBITDA and EBITDA/interest expense, have limita-
tions when evaluating team-level debt obligations. The
primary limitation is using GAAP EBITDA, which does
not take into account items such as cash bonuses,
deferred compensation and other cash items that are not
reflected on the income statement. As a result, EBITDA
may not be the most accurate proxy for a team’s cash
flow. Allowing for certain cash adjustments to EBITDA is
required. With this in mind, Fitch uses slightly altered
credit measures in rating team debt.
Leverage: The ratio of debt (at the team level) to a
team’s annual COR should not exceed 2.0 times (x) for
investment-grade consideration. 
Debt Service Coverage: As a general guideline, Fitch
has targeted a minimum ratio of operating income (total
revenues less total operating expenses and cash bonuses)
to annual debt service to be 1.5x for investment-grade
consideration. 
As mentioned previously, the relative strength of a
league’s economic model is also considered in establishing
an implied senior unsecured rating. The NFL’s economic
model is the strongest of all the major professional sports
leagues and helps to create a favorable credit environment
for the league’s individual franchises. The NFL’s robust
TV contracts roughly match a team’s largest expendi-
ture—player payroll. The NFL has a hard salary cap,
which establishes a maximum for player payroll and
adjusts player payroll according to the escalating nature of
annual national broadcast rights fees. Essentially, player
payroll and a team’s share of the national media contracts
are adjusted in tandem. This is viewed as a credit positive.
Debt service is reasonably protected given the league’s
conservative debt limitations, broad revenue sharing
arrangements, and solid industry fundamentals. Due to
the NFL’s sound economic policies, the ratings disparity
for teams in the league will be small relative to teams oper-
ating in leagues with weaker economic structures. 
For leagues in which revenues are not as equitably dis-
tributed, the effect is illustrated via a performance gap.
Small-market franchises find it increasingly more difficult
to compete with large-market teams, as they do not have
comparable economic resources to procure top player tal-
ent. From a ratings perspective, a lower shared percentage
6 Volume 2 • Number 1 • 2007 • IJSF
Executive Interview
requires greater scrutiny on a franchise’s local revenues.
These include gate receipts, local broadcasting rights, and
stadium-related revenue. These revenues are more closely
tied to market demographics and team performance. 
Collateral Coverage in Senior Secured Ratings
The second step in rating franchise debt assesses the over-
all collateral coverage provided by a pledge of the fran-
chise. Recent transaction prices serve as the most relevant
valuation measure. From an asset coverage standpoint,
most teams experience significant asset coverage over
committed secured debt amounts. Additionally, leagues
with actively enforced debt policies that limit an owner’s
ability to leverage a team help to ensure sufficient over-
collateralization. Fitch will notch above the implied sen-
ior unsecured rating by as many as three notches (see
Fitch’s criteria report, “Rating Methodology for U.S.
Senior Secured Bank Loans,” dated Sept. 28, 2000) where
ultimate recovery of principal is certain. In general, to
receive a three-notch enhancement on loan to values
(LTV) should be 50% or less. The 50% LTV guideline is
a general rule and should be matched against the overall
credit quality of the team. 
Anatomy of a Sports Franchise Transaction
The biggest credit risks in a sports franchise transaction
involve renewal of the national media contracts (and local
media contracts and other COR where appropriate), the
possibility of a work stoppage, and a deterioration in fran-
chise values. Fitch views favorably debt obligations that
contain structural features which help to offset these risks. 
National Media Contracts
Fitch considers renewal risk of national media contracts to
be among the most important factors in assessing the cred-
itworthiness of sports franchises. Because broadcasting
rights fees provide a substantial portion of a team’s rev-
enues, any adverse change in these contracts would likely
have a material effect on a team’s overall credit profile.
Ideally, the tenor of the debt obligation should expire prior
to the expiration of the national media contracts so as to
avoid renewal risk. When the maturity of the rated debt
obligation goes beyond the expiration of the national
media contracts, Fitch considers the historical trends in
renewals for sports programming and for the respective
league. In cases where creditors are exposed to broadcast
contract renewal risks, covenants that set minimum
thresholds for national broadcasting renewals are helpful
in providing remedies in the event league-wide broadcast-
ing contracts are lower than anticipated. Possible remedies
may include mandatory debt reductions, capital calls, and
debt acceleration. Fitch views positively structural features
which allow creditors to readjust credit risk in light of
lower than anticipated league-wide broadcasting renewals.
Labor Environment
Fitch views positively structural provisions that address
potential work stoppages. This applies to instances where
the CBA expires prior to the maturity of the rated debt
obligation. While contractual terms of the national media
contracts may provide for the continued receipt of
broadcasting fees during a work stoppage, teams will not
receive any game-related income (ticket sales) and may
have to remit refunds to ticket holders and sponsors. A
labor contingency reserve helps to offset this risk by pro-
tecting debt service in the event of a work stoppage.
Typically, labor contingency reserves will fund one-year’s
worth of debt service. Similar structural protections are
required for investment-grade sports facility ratings.
Collateral Coverage
Similar to an asset-based transaction, collateral valua-
tions are a key measure of credit support. Fitch views
favorably covenant triggers that set minimum team valu-
ations. Periodic appraisals and/or recent purchase trans-
actions may serve as the mechanisms for collateral
monitoring. Fitch examines the rights of creditors to
readjust credit risk if asset valuations decline. Mandatory
debt repayments to reduce LTVs and asset coverage to
prevailing rates are viewed most favorably as an offset to
potentially declining franchise values.
Support Agreements/Guarantees
In some cases, a team’s underlying credit profile may be
extremely weak and rated low on a stand-alone basis. In
these instances, a credit may require some type of third-
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party support. This support usually takes the form of an
“operating support” arrangement in which the owner or
supporting entity agrees to fund operating losses uncon-
ditionally or up to a specified, agreed upon amount.
Fitch’s implied senior unsecured rating factors in both
the team’s creditworthiness on a stand-alone basis and
the level of support provided by the outside party. In con-
sidering the level of support, a review of the outside
party’s financial ability to cover operating losses and debt
repayment are considered. The financial strength of the
support provider, as well as the level of support required
by creditors, helps determine the level of enhancement
given to the implied senior unsecured rating. 
Lock Box Mechanisms/Accounts
Certain lock-box or debt service account (DSA) struc-
tures may be established to provide debt service through
contractual revenue streams. Franchise debt transactions
may attempt to somewhat mitigate team financial risk by
creating a lock-box structure that directs national broad-
casting rights fees into a lock-box account. The lock-box
account deducts amounts required for debt service and
remits the remaining portion to the team. Additionally,
the transaction may require additional funds be held in
the DSA as added debt service protection. The DSA and
lock-box arrangement somewhat insulates creditors from
team-related risk. It should be noted that this structure
only serves as a method of payment and does not neces-
sarily protect creditors’ claims should the team file for
bankruptcy. The automatic-stay provision within the
bankruptcy code could freeze interest and principal pay-
ments owed to creditors. 
League Standstill Agreements 
One of the key considerations in rating a team’s debt
obligation is the ability/willingness of the governing
league to provide relief in a distressed scenario. Some
leagues, such as the NFL, have taken an active role in
helping financially troubled teams. In fact, the NFL, on a
few occasions, has stepped in to provide financial relief
and has helped facilitate the sale of a troubled franchise.
As a result, Fitch views the NFL’s demonstrated support
of its member clubs as a key source of support for NFL
franchise ratings. The NBA takes a similar position and
MLB has historically played an active role in supporting
some of its weaker franchises. Since 1975, two bankrupt-
cies have occurred in professional sports. Both times, the
bankruptcies were declared by the same team, the
Pittsburgh Penguins of the NHL. While the NHL was
actively involved with the Buffalo Sabres as the team
sought new ownership, in Fitch’s view, the NHL has yet
to demonstrate consistent financial support for its mem-
ber teams relative to, for example, the NFL. 
Q: What are the different types of risk that you incorpo-
rate in your sports ratings and how are those quantified?
A: For a financing that is pre-construction, construction
risk is the biggest concern when assigning a rating. While
most stadium/arena financings have guaranteed maxi-
mum price (GMP) contracts, other factors could impact
construction and ultimately delay the opening, negatively
impacting revenue. This can be mitigated by longer peri-
ods of capitalized interest and strict liquidated damages
packages with the contractor. For a financing that is in
operation, work stoppages, and associated potential long-
term fan alienation, and renewals of key contracts are the
two primary credit concerns. Work stoppages in the short-
term are usually covered by sufficient reserve levels.
Renewal risks are viewed as long-term contracts, and it has
been Fitch’s experience that these contracts are relatively
stable and a downward trend is more of a long-term event. 
Q: Over the past decade, some sport finance experts
thought that the use of asset backed securitization (ABS)
would become popular for the financing of U.S. sports
facilities, especially after the Pepsi Center and Staples
Center deals. This has not occurred. Why do you think
that ABS never took off here in North America? 
A: There have been a few sports transactions that have
been structured with securitization techniques (which is
what asset-backed means). Staples Center in LA and Pepsi
Center in Denver, which were issued a number of years
ago, are both rated in the A category and used ABS. The
only other major transaction in sports that is structured as
ABS, and it’s an important one, is MLB’s league-wide
credit facility. It’s a securitization of national TV revenue
that the league has with broadcast and cable partners, and
other key revenue streams. There is a lock box structure
such that bankruptcy risk is a lot less than other typical
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monetization techniques where you don’t have a separate-
ly segregated bankruptcy remote entity like in this case.
Having only three transactions using ABS is very limited.
There are a number of reasons for this. One is that in
asset-backed transactions it is necessary to carve out very
high quality long-term significant revenue contracts from
the overall business of the team, stadium, or arena. That
concept of stripping those particular revenue streams out
of the business is troublesome to those in industry who
would rather have full control of all of these types of rev-
enue contracts. They would rather use a more broad-
based, full basket of revenues instead of isolating and sell-
ing off certain contracts into a special trust. This is similar
to what was done in the Dolphins case described above.
Another reason for the limited use of ABS in sports is
that the ABS market grew up around transactions that
don’t have a lot of operating risk as a credit factor.
Examples include highly liquid home equity loans, stu-
dent loan receivables, and credit card receivables, where
one can structure, through various modeling techniques,
a transaction that has very little operating company expo-
sure. Essentially, these ABS structures set up a pool of
receivables and do the transactions around them. It is dif-
ferent from an operationally-based securitization where
you have the performance of teams, leagues, and sports
facilities as key linchpins that help drive the debt rating
process. Those operating risks make it much less of a
clean transaction relative to other traditional uses of ABS.
Los Angeles and Denver are both large markets with a
history of viable revenue streams and MLB’s television
revenues are large and low risk.
Q: How does each league’s Collective Bargaining
Agreement impact your work?
A: The leagues’ CBAs, when incorporated into a stadi-
um/arena deal, are stressed as referenced below. When we
look at the league ratings we certainly use the CBAs as a
key underlying credit factor. When a CBA is up to
expire/renew, we would usually expect key provisions to
remain the same. For example, we would not expect the
NFL to move away from the core revenue sharing func-
tions and hard salary cap. Smaller, more detailed items,
such as changes in the rookie salary “floors and ceilings”
would be less of a concern.
Q: What are some specific financial techniques that you
use in your job?
A: Fitch spends a good amount of time developing vari-
ous stress scenarios for both stadium and arena financ-
ing. For example, stressing various downside scenarios
associated with lower renewal rates with key revenue con-
tracts pledged to the bonds such as suites, club seats, and
advertising and sponsorships and how those lower rev-
enues impact debt service coverage ratios. By stressing,
we mean that we run scenarios with different levels of
renewal rates and then look at the likelihood of those dif-
ferent renewal rates occurring.
Future
Q: Where do you see the largest potential in revenue
growth for either sport facilities or sport franchises/leagues
globally?
A: Given the growth in new facilities in the US in all four
major sports over the last 15 years, Fitch feels that the best
growth potential is in college/university stadium finance
and European football stadium finance, both due to the
aging infrastructure and growing fan base. 
Q: What are some of the big unanswered questions in
sports debt financing or rating that you wish you had
answers to?
A: One area that is interesting is the tax benefits or advan-
tages from joint ownership of teams and facilities. There
are potentially related-party transactions between the two
that affect the underlying economic value of both busi-
nesses. A broad and in-depth academic study (or even
book) using actual financial data would be very much
appreciated by analysts like us. Additionally, the estimates
of franchise value created by Forbes magazine each year
are very popular, yet this is a tough business in which to
assign accurate valuations. An academic study that exam-
ines, in detail, the specific drivers of the valuation for each
team would also be very useful. Finally, team and facility
financing in the US and Europe is well known by us, but
we have less information on how things are done in Asia
or Latin America, for instance. What mechanisms are
used to finance teams and facilities in these areas? Do the
financial markets in these parts of the world get involved?
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